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During the 1970s and 1980s, the student senate at the
University of California at Berkeley debated and passed resolu-
tions on such local, state, and national issues as "gay and lesbian
rights, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, gun control, the
reelection of a particular United States Representative, a munici-
pal initiative to legalize marijuana, and the treatment of political
prisoners in foreign countries."' Some Berkeley students dis-
agreed with these resolutions and challenged them in court,
claiming that the university infringed upon their First Amend-
ment rights not to speak and not to associate themselves with
ideas or groups they disliked. Specifically, they insisted that the
university could not constitutionally use mandatory student
activity fees to support a student government that passes contro-
versial political resolutions.2
State universities use their mandatory student activity fees
to fund a wide range of student services and extracurricular
student groups.3 However, students, like those at Berkeley, often
object to having to subsidize their student government when they
disagree with the positions it takes on their behalf.4
t BA. 1992, University of Virginia; J.D. Candidate 1995, The University of Chicago.
' See Smith v Regents of University of California, 4 Cal 4th 843, 16 Cal Rptr 2d 181,
185 (1993), cert denied, 114 S Ct 181 (1993).
2 Id at 187. The First Amendment's limitations apply only to action that is "fairly
attributable to the State." Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., 457 US 922, 937 (1982). This
Comment considers only First Amendment challenges to speech funded by state univer-
sities. Whether the First Amendment applies to speech funded by private universities
depends on whether the private university's activities constitute "state action," id at 942,
a question that falls beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of what factors
courts consider in determining whether private-university actions amount to state action,
see Mindy A. Kaiden, Albert v. Carovano: The Second Circuit Redefines Under Color of
State Law for Private Universities, 39 Am U L Rev 239 (1989); Richard Thigpen, The
Application of Fourteenth Amendment Norms to Private Colleges and Universities, 11 J L
& Educ 171 (1982).
3 See Smith, 16 Cal Rptr 2d at 185.
" See generally David Meabon, David Suddick, and Annette Gibbs, A Student Activi-
ty Fee Primer: Current Research on Collection, Control, and Allocation (National Associa-
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The Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right
to refrain from speaking. However, it has also noted that the
First Amendment's protection against forced speech and manda-
tory funding of speech are not absolute and sometimes give way
in the face of pressing government interests. Accordingly, some
university administrators have argued that their institutions'
unique educational mission justifies the use of mandatory fees to
fund student governments that pass political resolutions. Where
this question has been litigated, university officials have insisted
that such resolutions help educate participating students and
spark vigorous student debate over current events and important
social issues.
Although lower courts have addressed this issue, the Su-
preme Court has not yet decided whether a state university
violates the First Amendment when it uses mandatory fees to
fund a student government that passes political resolutions.5 The
two state supreme courts that have considered the issue have
reached opposite conclusions.' This unresolved conflict invites
further litigation.
Students have also challenged university funding of ideolog-
ical and political student groups-those student organizations
formed to promote a specific ideological agenda. Unlike student
government, ideological and political groups such as NOW,
Amnesty International, and the Young Democrats represent only
a fraction of the student body. Nonetheless, lower courts have
assumed that mandatory funding of ideological and political
student groups presents the same First Amendment issues as
mandatory funding of student government resolutions.
This Comment focuses on student government resolutions
that speak for the entire student body, and concludes that fund-
ing a student government that passes political resolutions vio-
lates the First Amendment. In arriving at this conclusion, the
Comment distinguishes student ideological groups that purport to
speak only for their members and suggests that funding such
groups is constitutional. Section I discusses the role that student
government resolutions currently play at public universities.
tion for Campus Activities, 1985); David L. Meabon, Robert E. Alexander, and Katherine
E. Hunter, Student Activity Fees: A Legal and National Perspective (National Entertain-
ment and Campus Activities Association, 1979).
' On October 4, 1993, the United States Supreme Court denied California's petition
for certiorari in the Smith case. Regents of University of California v Smith, 114 S Ct 181
(1993).
6 See Section III.
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Section II reviews the First Amendment case law that recognizes
a right not to speak or fund speech. Section III summarizes the
two state supreme court cases addressing First Amendment
challenges to mandatory funding of student government political
resolutions. Finally, Section IV concludes that the First Amend-
ment prevents a state university from forcing a student to fund a
student government that purports to make political statements
on her behalf.
I. THE NATuRE OF THE PROBLEM
In 1965, when President Johnson underwent gall bladder
surgery, the student council at Georgetown University considered
a resolution to send him a get-well card. After some debate, the
resolution was rejected as partisan and inherently beyond the
purview of the student council, supposedly an impartial represen-
tative assembly As then-Georgetown-student Bill Clinton wrote
in his race for student council president two years later, "[t]he
student council is the instrument of the students, it is NOT a
debating society or a forum for hollow resolutions."8
Often, however, student governments fail to exercise such
restraint. Instead, they pass resolutions that purport to speak for
the entire student body and advocate particular viewpoints on
divisive political issues. These resolutions very rarely reflect a
uniformity of opinion within the student body. Recent examples
illustrate these points.
Several student governments have passed resolutions chal-
lenging government policy toward homosexuals. For example, the
student government at the University of Washington ("UW")
passed a resolution condemning the military's refusal to commis-
sion homosexual ROTC members as officers.9 The resolution also
urged the UW Board of Regents and administrators to pressure
Congress to change the military's policy. Many students opposed
the resolution, insisting that the presence of homosexual officers
would adversely affect, among other things, the ability of the
armed forces to maintain discipline and morale and to "facilitate
assignment and worldwide deployment of members who frequent-
Dick Williams, Clinton's College Life, Atlanta Const F1 (Oct 4, 1992).
8 Bill Clinton, Young President Clinton, NY Times A17 (Dec 21, 1992) (reprinting
excerpts from Bill Clinton's campaign pamphlet in his 1967 race for Georgetown Universi-
ty student council president).
' Sally MacDonald, Ban on Homosexual ROTC Officers Protested by Students, Seattle
Times A5 (May 5, 1990).
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ly must live and work under close conditions affording minimal
privacy.
") °
Student governments have not limited their review of gov-
ernment policy to its treatment of homosexuals. In fact, no politi-
cal issue has proved immune from scrutiny.1 For example, the
Persian Gulf War inspired the University of Montana student
senate to pass a resolution opposing it' and the University of
Alabama student government to pass a resolution supporting the
troops and the war." Neither resolution reflected the sentiment
of the entire student body. At Montana, the more common stu-
dent reaction to the war was not antagonism but rather "baffle-
ment, concern, and ambivalence."'4  Some campus student
groups affirmatively rallied in support of the war effort, showing
their disagreement with the student senate resolution. 5 Like-
wise, the Alabama resolution did not meet with general support
from the student body. Indeed, in an effort to defuse mounting
tension, University of Alabama administrators called a special
forum at which students could vent their opposing viewpoints
over the war in a neutral setting.
16
Student governments have also passed resolutions on a host
of other social issues. For instance, at Texas A&M the student
senate passed a resolution condemning "cultural insensitivity."'7
This resolution, coming in close temporal proximity with the
university's decision to add a multicultural requirement to the
10 Id.
" For example, the student senate at Eastern Kentucky University passed a resolu-
tion challenging the United States Army's plan to incinerate chemical weapons. Keith
Schneider, U.S. Plan to Burn Chemical Weapons Stirs Public Fear, NY Times Al, A12
(Apr 29, 1991). In addition, student senates at the Lewis-Clark State College and Univer-
sity of Idaho have passed numerous resolutions opposing pending state legislation that
would reduce state funding for institutions of higher learning. LCSC Students Aid Foes of
1% Initiative, Lewiston Morning Trib 8A (Oct 21, 1992) (Lewis-Clark State College);
Michael R. Wickline, 1 Percent Initiative: 'The Options Aren't Pretty Higher Education
Institutions in Idaho Warn of Big Cutbacks, Lewiston Morning Trib 8A (Oct 26, 1992)
(University of Idaho).
1 Barbara Reynolds, War on Campus: Debate Over Gulf War Reawakens Activism,
USA Today 11A (Feb 7, 1991) (interview with Todd Gitlin, a UC Berkeley sociologist and
former Vietnam protester); Todd Gitlin, Student Activism Without Barricades, LA Times
Ml (Dec 23, 1990).
1 S. Shyam Sundar, The Persian Gulf War-The Student Front at Alabama, LA
Times M4 (Jan 27, 1991).
14 Gitlin, LA Times at M1.
15 Id.
16 Sundar, LA Times at M4.
17 Linda Stewart, A&M Shoved into Debate over Multicultural Courses, Dallas Morn-
ing News 47A (July 4, 1993).
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mandatory student core curriculum, was part of a heated debate
during which the University Republicans called upon alumni to
withhold contributions in protest of such "politically correct in-
doctrination."18
Similarly, at Tufts University, a controversial speaker in-
spired a student senate resolution condemning the Nation of
Islam for holding Jews responsible for apartheid. 9 However, the
student body was sharply divided on this issue. One freshman
wrote in a campus newspaper editorial, "For all of you
white/Jewish students who opposed [condemning Jews for apart-
heid], the truth hurts, now, lick your wounds and deal with it." 0
As a Tufts rabbi commented, "In my 13 years at Tufts, I can't
remember feeling quite so much anger and tension between black
and Jewish students."2'
At Douglass College, the student government passed a reso-
lution condemning pornography and recommending that three
magazines and a greeting card that the student government
considered pornographic be removed from the campus store.'
Many female and male students hotly disagreed with the resolu-
tion. One senior noted: "Pornography is part of our culture; we
are not changing the issue by removing the magazines."' In the
uproar over the resolution, sales of the three magazines doubled
and the greeting cards sold out.'
As these few examples indicate, a significant number of uni-
versity students often disagree with the diverse and controversial
resolutions passed by their student governments. Others would
prefer not to take a public position on these issues at all. When a
university uses mandatory student activity fees to fund political
resolutions, however, these dissenters are compelled to support
the political positions endorsed by the majority.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE
Students dissatisfied with their student governments' politi-
cal resolutions have challenged the validity of such resolutions in
court. Specifically, some student-plaintiffs have alleged that state
18 Id.
19 Leonard Zakim, Confronting Hatred, Jewish Advocate 8 (Apr 24-30, 1992).
20 Id.
21 Id.
' Student Groups Censor Students on Three Campuses, NY Times 40 (Jan 19, 1992).
23 Id.
24 Id.
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universities violate their First Amendment rights to refrain from
speaking or from funding political speech when the schools use
mandatory fees to fund a student government that passes politi-
cal resolutions.
This Section will first explore the Supreme Court's treatment
of the First Amendment right to refrain from speaking when this
right conflicts with pressing government interests. It next ad-
dresses the way in which lower courts have dealt with First
Amendment challenges to a university's use of mandatory stu-
dent fees to fund political or ideological student groups such as
NOW, Amnesty International, and the Young Democrats.
A. The Right to Refrain from Speaking
In West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, the Supreme
Court recognized that the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause
protects the right to be free from compelled speech and associa-
tion.' In Barnette, the Supreme Court struck down a West Vir-
ginia law that compelled public school students to pledge alle-
giance to the United States flag. Writing for the Court, Justice
Jackson recognized that the First Amendment protects not just
an individual's right to speak freely, but the concomitant right to
refrain from speaking at all:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein."
The Supreme Court has extended the right to refrain from
speaking to include the right of an individual to abstain from
funding political speech with which she disagrees.' In Abood v
' 319 US 624, 642 (1943). The First Amendment protects freedom of association, and
"therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate." Roberts v United States Jay-
cees, 468 US 609, 623 (1984) (holding that a Minnesota law requiring the United States
Jaycees to admit women did not abridge male members' freedom of association). Similar-
ly, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment right to speak implies a
corresponding right to "refrain from speaking." Wooley v Maynard, 430 US 705, 714 (1977)
(invalidating a New Hampshire law compelling drivers to endorse the motto "Live Free or
Die" on their license plates).
' 319 US at 642. The right not to speak or associate allows an individual to deter-
mine for herself what identity or personality she will present to the world. "A system
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political and ideological causes must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts." Wooley, 430 US at
714.
The Court has applied the right to refrain from speaking in a variety of settings.
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Detroit Board of Education, nonunion teachers challenged
Michigan's agency shop rules, which compelled them to pay a
service charge to the union that negotiated their collective bar-
gaining agreement." The nonunion teachers disapproved of the
union's use of the service charge to fund a variety of "economic,
political, professional, scientific and religious" activites that were
unrelated to collective bargaining.29 They argued that compel-
ling them to fund these activities violated the First Amend-
ment.
30
The Court held that while the union could use the mandato-
ry dues to finance political activities germane to collective bar-
gaining, it could not use them to finance political or ideological
causes unrelated to collective bargaining without violating the
First Amendment.3 According to the Court, "[tihe fact that [em-
ployees] are compelled to make... contributions for political
purposes works ... [as] an infringement of their constitutional
rights."32 The Court acknowledged Thomas Jefferson's view that
"to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propa-
gation of opinions which he disbelieves[ ] is sinful and tyranni-
cal."' Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court's denial of
relief and remanded to provide the plaintiff-teachers with the
See, for example, Torcaso v Watkins, 367 US 488, 496 (1961) (striking down as invasive of
"freedom of belief and religion" a Maryland requirement that civil servants utter oaths
affirming belief in God); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo, 418 US 241, 255-56
(1974) (holding that a newspaper could not be compelled to print a reply by a political
candidate criticized in the paper); Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347, 356 (1976) (holding that
sheriff's employees could not be compelled to support a political party in order to keep
their jobs); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 475 US 1,
10-11 (1986) (overturning a utility commission's rule requiring a company to distribute a
consumer organization's communications with its bill).
431 US 209, 212-13 (1977). "A union that obtains the support of a majority of
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit is designated the exclusive representative of
those employees. A union so designated is under a duty of fair representation to all
employees in the unit, whether or not [they are] union members." Id at 223-24 (citations
omitted). In an agency shop, every employee represented by a union, whether or not a
member of that union, must pay a service charge to the union. This requirement insures
that all employees contribute to their exclusive bargaining representative and prevents
nonmember employees from free riding on the efforts of union members. Id at 221-22.
' Id at 213. The plaintiff-teachers did not describe the nature of these activities in
any further detail. Id at 213 n 3.
30 Id at 213.
3' Id at 235-36.
Id at 234. The Court further noted that "at the heart of the First Amendment is
the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society
one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State." Id at 234-35.
' Id at 235 n 31, quoting Thomas Jefferson, as quoted in Irving Brant, James Madi-
son: The Nationalist 1780-1787 354 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1948).
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opportunity to prove the allegations set forth in their com-
plaint.
However, the Abood Court also indicated that First Amend-
ment protections are not absolute in a mandatory-fee context. It
concluded that the nonunion teachers could be compelled to sup-
port the union financially in order to advance the state's compel-
ling interest in promoting labor peace. 5 Thus, Michigan's
agency shop rules did not violate the First Amendment so long as
the mandatory dues were not used to pay for political speech
unrelated to the union's role as collective bargaining agent."6
The Supreme Court applied the same reasoning to strike
down the political activities of an integrated state bar associa-
tion.37 In Keller v State Bar of California, the Court held that
the California Bar's use of compulsory dues to fund an annual
conference of delegates that passed political resolutions endorsing
gun control and a nuclear freeze initiative was unconstitution-
al. 8 The Court concluded that these expenditures violated the
First Amendment rights of members who objected to the resolu-
tions because such expenditures were "not necessarily or reason-
ably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or
improving the quality of legal services." 9
3' 431 US at 241-42.
5 Id at 234-37.
' Id. The Supreme Court noted that the union could not avoid the First Amendment
problem simply by applying dissenters' monies only to apolitical union expenses. Because
this shifting of funds leaves the same total amount of money at the organization's disposal
and permits the organization to spend the same amount on political activities, earmarking
"is of bookkeeping significance only rather than a matter of real substance." Id at 237 n
35, quoting Retail Clerks Local 1625 v Schermerhorn, 373 US 746, 753 (1963).
' In an "integrated bar," membership and dues are required as a condition of practic-
ing law in that state.
38 496 US 1, 16 (1990). Petitioners' complaint alleged that the conference of delegates
funded and sponsored by the California Bar endorsed a gun control initiative, disapproved
statements of a United States Senate candidate regarding court review of a victim's bill of
rights, endorsed a nuclear freeze initiative, and opposed federal legislation limiting
federal court jurisdiction over abortions, public school prayer, and busing. Id at 6 n 2.
For in-depth analyses of Keller, see Note, Renovating the Bar after Keller v. State
Bar of California: A Proposal for Strict Limits on Compulsory Fee Expenditures, 25 USF L
Rev 681, 711-16 (1991) (arguing bar should limit dues expenditures to only those neces-
sarily or reasonably related to its function of regulating the legal profession); Note, Keller
v. State Bar of California: Freedom From Ideological Association for Members of Integrat-
ed Bar Associations, 35 SLU L J 903, 923-29 (1991) (predicting that state bar associations
will develop procedures through which members who have fimding objections may air
their grievances); Casenote, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Compulsory State
Bar Associations: Keller v. State Bar of California, 68 U Detroit L Rev 297, 304 (1991)
(contending that courts will soon develop criteria for evaluating "the constitutional per-
missibility of a wide range of political and ideological programs," thereby nullifying the
initial caution and confusion created by Keller).
' 496 US at 15-16. Previously, in Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), the Su-
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Recently, in Lehnert v Ferris Faculty Ass'n, the Court provid-
ed greater guidance as to when a union can spend compulsory
dues on political speech." In Lehnert, the Court held that, in
order to be constitutional, the use of dissenters' dues for political
activity must be "germane to collective bargaining," must be
"justified by the government's vital policy interest in preserving
peace and eliminating free riders,"4' and must not significantly
add to the First Amendment burden inherent in compelling all
workers to pay dues to the union that represents them.'
In Lehnert, the Court held that under this three-prong test
the union had only limited power to fund political activities with
mandatory dues. Justice Blackmun stated that the plaintiffs
could not be compelled to subsidize public relations activities
because the activities were "not sufficiently related" to the
union's collective bargaining function even though these activities
might have enhanced the reputation of the teaching profession
and improved the union's bargaining position.' Similarly,
Blackmun concluded that the union could require dissenters to
pay for only those lobbying activities within "the limited context
of contract ratification or implementation."" The union could
not compel the plaintiffs to subsidize lobbying on other issues,
even those as closely related to the union's interests as taxes for
the support of public education.45
preme Court had rejected a lawyer's challenge to a state bar requirement that he join and
pay dues to an integrated state bar association. However, in a split decision, the Lathrop
court decided not to address the issue of whether lawyers' free speech rights were in-
fringed when their dues were used by the bar to finance political activities with which
they disagreed. Id at 845.
40 500 US 507, 519-22 (1991). For a look at how courts have applied Lehnert in the
union-dues context, see Note, Defining the Permissible Uses of Objecting Members'Agency
Dues: Is the Solution Any Clearer After Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n?, 70 U Detroit
Mercy L Rev 89, 122-23 (1992) (arguing that more deference should be accorded union
lobbying and public relations activities as these are reasonably designed to influence
public employees' position at the bargaining table); Note, Respecting Nonunion Member
Employees' Rights While Avoiding a Free Ride, Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 10
Hofstra Labor L J 349, 363-73 (1992) (concluding that Lehnert provides a clearer under-
standing of what is chargeable to nonmember employees).
"' "Free riders" refers to those nonunion members who, by not paying a service
charge to the union, would unfairly piggyback on the collective bargaining efforts of union
members. See Abood, 431 US at 221-22.
42 500 US at 519.
' Id at 528. Parts of Blackmun's opinion in this case delivered the opinion of the
Court, but some parts of his opinion were joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Stevens. The latter parts will hereafter be referred to collectively as
the "Blackmun opinion."
Id at 522 (Blackmun opinion).
Id at 527 (Blackmun opinion).
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The Supreme Court has therefore invalidated compulsory
funding of political speech where that speech was not "sufficient-
ly related" to the function of the union or bar. In Abood, Keller,
and Lehnert, the Court required a close fit between political
speech that may be constitutionally funded and the union's or
bar's mission.
B. The Funding of Ideological and Political Student Groups
While most student groups are devoted to academic, cultural,
or recreational pursuits, 4" other groups like NOW, Amnesty In-
ternational, and partisan organizations like the Young Democrats
and Young Republicans pursue ideological or political goals.47
Some students have challenged their universities' use of manda-
tory fees to fund these groups." Reviewing the case law ad-
The physics club, the Spanish club, and the ski club are a few typical examples.
4 A detailed examination of the constitutionality of the funding of political student
groups is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an exhaustive treatment of the constitu-
tionality of such funding, see generally Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service
Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 Rutgers L Rev
3, 51-52 (1983) (concluding that First Amendment constitutional concerns are satisfied by
neutral funding allocation); Charles Thomas Steele, Jr., Mandatory Student Fees at Public
Universities: Bringing the First Amendment Within the Campus Gate, 13 J Coll & Univ L
353, 374 (1987) (concluding that only funding of organizations that are "essentially parti-
san and noneducational in nature" infringes upon First Amendment rights); Recent
Developments, Constitutional Law: The First Amendment and Compulsory Funding of
Political Advocacy-Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (1985), 9 Harv J L & Pub Policy 731,
735-36 (1986) (arguing that unless many voices are speaking in the forum, people should
not be forced to subsidize those who are); Note, The Constitutionality of Student Fees for
Political Student Groups in the Campus Public Forum: Galda v. Bloustein and the Right
to Associate, 15 Rutgers L J 135, 179-84 (1983) (reasoning that university funding of
political student groups with mandatory fees does not violate the First Amendment so
long as funds are distributed in a neutral manner and can be refunded upon request);
Comment, "Fee Speech': First Amendment Limitations on Student Fee Expenditures, 20
Cal W L Rev 279, 309-11 (1984) (concluding that university funding is permissible as long
as there is a forum to which dissenters have access or dissenters have the option to
withhold funds); Comment, Who Should Speak? Who Should Pay? The Complexities of
Refunding Student Fees at Public Colleges and Universities, 11 J Coll & Univ L 481, 495-
99 (1985) (emphasizing need to consider nature of fee, manner and motivation behind
proposed refund, and ethical consequences of refund policy); Comment, Mandatory Stu-
dent Fees: First Amendment Concerns and University Discretion, 55 U Chi L Rev 363, 395
(1988) (arguing that critical question for determining constitutionality is whether program
allows all organizations "to compete for funds on an equal footing"); Note, A Funny Thing
Happens When You Pay for a Forum: Mandatory Student Fees To Support Political Speech
at Public Universities, 103 Yale L J 2009, 2021-38 (1994) (applying the public forum
doctrine to state universities and concluding that university officials cannot discriminate
against political groups).
' The question of funding for ideological student groups has been litigated in a
number of settings. See, for example, Smith v Regents of University of California, 4 Cal
4th 843, 16 Cal Rptr 2d 181, 187-95 (1993), cert denied, 114 S Ct 181 (1993) (regarding
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dressing this controversy sheds light on the issues surrounding
the funding of student government political resolutions.49
In Carroll v Blinken, the Second Circuit upheld the State
University of New York's use of mandatory fees to support an
ideological student group. 0 According to the court, the funding
promoted "a substantial government interest that would [have
been] achieved less effectively absent the regulation" allocating
the activity fees.5 The court, relying on Abood, conceded that
the student-plaintiffs had a viable First Amendment right not to
fund ideological speech.52 Nonetheless, the court upheld the
university's decision to fund the group with mandatory fees,
holding that the university's interests in providing a rich extra-
curricular environment, educating students, and creating a di-
verse forum for the expression of controversial ideas could not be
student objections to funding of fourteen politically active student groups, including
Campus NOW and Campus Abortion Rights Action League); Hays County Guardian v
Supple, 969 F2d 111 (5th Cir 1992), cert denied, 113 S Ct 1067 (1993) (regarding student
objections to funding of a university newspaper); Carroll v Blinken, 957 F2d 991 (2d Cir
1992) (concerning student objections to funding of NYPIRG, a public interest group with a
liberal, progressive political agenda); Galda v Rutgers, 772 F2d 1060 (3d Cir 1985) (ad-
dressing student objections to a separate mandatory fee to support the New Jersey PIRG,
a political advocacy group); Kania v Fordham, 702 F2d 475 (4th Cir 1983) (concerning
student objections to funding of school newspaper that printed controversial editorials);
Arrington v Taylor, 380 F Supp 1348 (M D NC 1974) (regarding student objections to
funding of school newspaper); Veed v Schwartzkopf, 353 F Supp 149 (D Neb 1973), aff'd,
478 F2d 1407 (8th Cir 1973) (regarding student objections to funding of school newspaper,
student association, and speaker series); Larson v Board of Regents of University of
Nebraska, 189 Neb 688, 204 NW2d 568 (1973) (concerning student objections to funding of
student newspaper and speaker series); Lace v University of Vermont, 131 Vt 170, 303
A2d 475 (1973) (regarding student objections to funding of speaker series, student news-
paper, and film series).
'9 Student government speech can and should be distinguished from speech promul-
gated by ideological and political student groups. First, while there can be an infinite
number of political and ideological student groups in the university community, each
equally able to speak in opposition to views espoused by other groups, there is but one
student government, which claims to represent everyone. Second, while personal associa-
tion with political and ideological groups is voluntary, all students are necessarily viewed
as "affiliated" with the student government. Third, while these voluntary groups speak on
behalf of only their members, the student government speaks for the entire, diverse
student body. The student government and political or ideological groups thus present
distinct constitutional questions, each meriting a separate though related constitutional
analysis. Despite these distinctions, however, several important general principles that
emerge from the ideological-student-group cases apply to student government resolutions
as well.
50 957 F2d 991, 1003 (2d Cir 1992).
"' Id at 999, quoting United States v Albertini, 472 US 675, 689 (1985).
6 957 F2d at 997 ("A student cannot pay the full fee without paying [the ideological
group] and he or she cannot continue as a student without paying the full fee. Whether
justified or not, that is forced association and speech ... .").
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achieved through any means less restrictive of First Amendment
freedoms."
However, the Carroll court rejected the ideological group's
automatic-membership policy, by which the group purported to
speak on political issues on behalf of the entire student body.'
While the court was willing to uphold the university's use of
mandatory student fees to support the group where it was just
one among a myriad of other diverse student groups engaged in
political speech, the court would not allow the university to fund
the group where the group had an unfair advantage over the
other student groups. As the court noted:
Far from fulfilling SUNY Albany's interest in promoting
campus pluralism and free choice among several avenues of
informal learning, allowing one group to make members of
all students gives it an unearned advantage in the campus
competition for hearts and minds.... By... claiming to
represent the interests of the [entire] student body, [the
group] has irredeemably transgressed the proscription
against forced association .... [The group's] membership
provision amounts to special treatment that skews the
university's otherwise neutral support of a variety of
viewpoints.5
The Carroll court's analysis suggests that a university may not
fund a student government, which by definition speaks on behalf
of the entire student body, that passes political resolutions. Be-
cause student government has a special advantage that follows
from students' mandatory association, such funding would not
enhance a "balance in access"56 for all student groups. To the
contrary, in subsidizing the political speech of a student govern-
ment, a university would be damaging the diverse forum of ideas
it is so eager to protect and cultivate.
By contrast, in Smith v Regents of University of California
the California Supreme Court ruled that the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley's use of mandatory student fees to fund politi-
cal student groups violated the First Amendment.57 The court,
Id at 1001-02.
Id at 1003.
Id (emphasis added).
Id, quoting Galda, 772 F2d at 1067.
57 4 Cal 4th 843, 16 Cal Rptr 2d 181, 198 (1993), cert denied, 114 S Ct 181 (1993).
The Smith court was presented with constitutional challenges both to the funding of
ideological and political student groups and to the funding of the Berkeley student govern-
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relying on Abood, Keller, and Lehnert, applied a strict scrutiny
test." Declaring that "a group's dedication to achieving its polit-
ical or ideological goals, at some point, begins to outweigh any
legitimate claim it may have to be educating students on the
University's behalf,"9 the court concluded that the use of man-
datory fees to fund political student groups could not be
justified.0 In short, the court concluded that means less restric-
tive of students' First Amendment freedoms existed for the uni-
versity to achieve its educational interests.61
Likewise, in Galda v Rutgers, the Third Circuit found that
Rutgers University's funding of a nonprofit statewide ideological
student organization with a mandatory student assessment vio-
lated the First Amendment. 2 The court found that the organiza-
tion functioned essentially as a political action group with only
an incidental educational component."3 The court applied the
Supreme Court's analysis in the union dues cases, declaring, "[i]n
short, what Abood holds objectionable is the 'compulsory subsidi-
zation of ideological activity' by those who object to it."' 4 The
court concluded that the university failed to show that any "com-
pelling state interest" justified the imposition of a separate man-
datory fee to support a group "dedicated to advancing one posi-
tion" when alternatives less restrictive of student rights could
have provided the same educational benefits to participating
students.65
In sum, the lower court cases dealing with mandatory fund-
ing of ideological student groups illustrate a number of important
points for this Comment's analysis of student government politi-
ment that passed political resolutions. This Section of the Comment addresses the part of
the Smith court's decision dealing with the funding of ideological and political groups as a
prelude to a discussion of Smith's treatment of student government political resolutions in
Section III.B.
0 16 Cal Rptr 2d at 189.
&9 Id.
Go Id at 194.
'1 Id.
772 F2d 1060, 1068 (3d Cir 1985).
Id at 1065. In Galda, the court was presented with the university's assessment and
use of a segregated fee earmarked specifically for the organization in question. The court
explicitly stated that it did not need to extend its analysis to the situation presented by
use of the general student activity fee to fund controversial student groups. Id at 1064.
Nonetheless, the Galda court's analysis sheds light on the First Amendment implications
of using mandatory student fees to fund ideological student groups.
Id at 1064, quotingAbood, 431 US at 237.
772 F2d at 1067. The court contrasted this use of a mandatory fee with a union's
use of dissenters' dues, which could be justified by the state's compelling interest in
promoting labor peace and avoiding a free-rider problem. Id at 1066-67.
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cal resolutions. First, these courts recognize that a university's
use of mandatory student fees creates a First Amendment burden
on those fee-paying students who object to the funded speech.
Second, the courts have extended the Supreme Court's union
dues and integrated bar analysis to the context of state
universities' use of mandatory fees, finding such precedent the
appropriate source of law on which to draw.66 Third, although
they do not specifically address the funding of student govern-
ment resolutions, these cases demonstrate that a university's use
of mandatory fees to fund student groups becomes more problem-
atic as the number- of viewpoints funded in the university com-
munity decreases, or as any one student group engaged in politi-
cal speech enjoys an unfair advantage vis-h-vis other student
groups.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER FUNDING
STUDENT GOVERNMENT POLITICAL RESOLUTIONS
So far, the only two courts confronted with First Amendment
challenges to mandatory funding of student government political
resolutions have reached opposite conclusions. This Section ex-
amines the virtues and shortcomings of both approaches.
A. The Good Approach: Funding Is Constitutional
In Good v Associated Students of University of Washington,
the Washington Supreme Court upheld the University of
Washington's use of mandatory dues to subsidize political resolu-
tions passed by the student senate.67 The Good court found that
student government resolutions contributed to the university's
forum of ideas by fostering debate on important social issues.'
6 See Carroll, 957 F2d at 996-98; Smith, 16 Cal Rptr 2d at 187-98; Galda, 772 F2d
at 1063-64.
' 86 Wash 2d 94, 542 P2d 762, 769-70 (1975).
63 Id at 768-69. Good, like many ideological-student-group cases, relies on the identity
of a public university as a public forum to support its analysis. See Hays County Guard-
ian v Supple, 969 F2d 111, 116-17 (5th Cir 1992), cert denied, 113 S Ct 1067 (1993)
(holding that a public university campus is a "designated" public forum). As a public
forum, a university assumes a special status; it must allow access to all who wish to
speak, though it may exclude those groups who would disrupt the educational environ-
ment. See, for example, Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981) (religious group could not
be denied access to university facilities). Courts like the Good court have upheld the use
of mandatory student fees to support a controversial group, reasoning that the complain-
ing students' mandatory fees actually support a forum created by the diverse student
groups taken as a whole rather than any one particular group. See, for example,
Arrington v Taylor, 380 F Supp 1348, 1362 (M D NC 1974) (noting that the university
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The court held that the university's traditional interest in provid-
ing an atmosphere of learning and debate outweighed the
students' First Amendment rights as long as the student senate
did not "become the vehicle for the promotion of one particular
viewpoint... ." The court remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether the student senate had an impermissible ideologi-
cal bias."
Good's analysis is flawed in several critical respects. First, in
order to assure that it was not funding a student government
that consistently promoted one ideology, a university would have
to examine the political viewpoints of the student government's
resolutions as they were passed."' However, the Supreme Court
has clearly indicated that the government may not base funding
decisions on the ideological viewpoint of speech under consider-
ation.
In Regan v Taxation with Representation of Washington, the
Supreme Court upheld legislation that denied a certain group a
tax preference. 2 Congress denied the preference because the
group planned to engage in substantial political lobbying. The
Court held that while Congress cannot penalize organizations for
newspaper does not speak on behalf of any particular group, but instead provides a forum
whereby diverse views on controversial subjects may be presented); Veed v Schwartzkopf,
353 F Supp 149, 152 (D Neb 1973), aff'd, 478 F2d 1407 (8th Cir 1973) (concluding that
university may use mandatory fees to provide forum for the expression of political and
personal opinions so long as the forum does not discriminate against any particular
viewpoint); Lace v University of Vermont, 131 Vt 170, 303 A2d 475, 479-80 (1973) (holding
that mandatory funding of forum contributes to the "marketplace of ideas" and is permis-
sible so long as equal and proportionate access is assured). See also Note, 103 Yale L J at
2038 (cited in note 47) (concluding that public forum doctrine prohibits denial of equal
access to political groups). This Comment suggests that the argument that the funds
create a forum for debate is inapposite where a university uses mandatory fees to support
student government, the exclusive mouthpiece of the student body. Viewpoint-based
arguments are red herrings; rather, the focus should be on the compelled speech doctrine.
Thus, the fact that there is some debate before the passage of a resolution is irrelevant
because some students will still find their funds being used to espouse views with which
they disagree.
9 542 P2d at 769.
70 Id at 770.
" This approach is not unique. In Larson v Board of Regents of University of Nebras-
ka, 189 Neb 688, 204 NW2d 568 (1973), a group of students objected to the university's
use of mandatory student fees to fund a school newspaper and a speakers' program. The
Larson court imposed a duty on the university to make sure that "such a newspa-
per... not be allowed to become a vehicle for expressing a single political point of view."
Id at 571. The Good court, treating student government as any other student group
engaged in political speech, relied on this analysis, holding that a student government
could pass political resolutions as long as it did not become the vehicle for any particular
ideology. 542 P2d at 769.
72 461 US 540, 545-46 (1983).
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exercising their First Amendment speech rights through lobby-
ing, Congress is under no constitutional obligation to subsidize
them with public funds." However, the Court indicated that
Congress may refuse to subsidize speech only if in doing so it
does not "discriminate invidiously" against a certain viewpoint.74
Thus, if the legislation had denied the group a tax preference
based on the particular viewpoint the group expressed through
lobbying (against federal tax laws) while allowing a tax prefer-
ence for similar lobbying groups based on their viewpoint (in
support of federal tax laws), the legislation would have been
disallowed.
Analogously, a public university may not consider the ideo-
logical viewpoint of a student government political resolution
when deciding whether to fund it, as Good's solution would re-
quire.75 A state cannot justify viewpoint discrimination as an
attempt to correct for an existing ideological imbalance.
Even if a university, consistent with the First Amendment,
could use its funding decisions to adjust the ideological tenor of
its student government, two problems with the Good court's solu-
tion remain. First, the ideological-balancing inquiry begs the
central constitutional question that student government political
resolutions present. In promoting such a test, the Good court did
7s Id. "Although [the group at issue] does not have as much money as it wants, and
thus cannot exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like, the Constitution 'does
not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages
of that freedom.'" Id at 550, quoting Harris v McRae, 448 US 297, 318 (1980). Thus, while
the state may not interfere with valid First Amendment rights, it does not have to subsi-
dize the exercise of those rights. See also Lyng v Automobile Workers, 485 US 360 (1988)
(upholding a federal statute that made strikers ineligible for food stamps); Regan, 461 US
at 545 (holding that Congress need not "grant a benefit.., to a person who wishes to
exercise a constitutional right"); Harris, 448 US at 316 ("[A]lthough government may not
place obstacles in the path of a [person's] exercise of [a constitutional right], it need not
remove those not of its own creation."); Maher v Roe, 432 US 464, 479-80 (1977) (holding
that state may refuse to fund abortions that are not medically necessary); Cammarano v
United States, 358 US 498, 513 (1959) (holding that income tax deductions are not re-
quired for funds expended on lobbying).
74 461 US at 548.
' For a thorough explanation of the Regan doctrine and the concept of viewpoint
discrimination in subsidy .cases, see Comment, University Regulation of Student Speech:
Considering Content-Based Criteria Under Public Forum and Subsidy Doctrines, 1991 U
Chi Legal F 393, 399-401 (arguing that viewpoint discrimination in university funding of
student groups is more problematic than content discrimination under the First Amend-
ment because it expresses state bias); Note, 103 Yale L J at 2030-38 (cited in note 47)
(concluding that viewpoint discrimination by university officials is particularly egregious
in light of the public forum doctrine). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 189, 234-51 (1983) (arguing for close scrutiny
of viewpoint-based restrictions).
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not consider the compelled speech problem inherent even in a
student government that is ideologically balanced over time. A
student government, each time it passes a political resolution,
takes a position on a highly controversial issue on behalf of all
students-even those who dissent or wish to remain silent on the
matter. Good, decided before Abood, ignores this line of inquiry,
and instead treats student government as one of various other
politically active student groups that contribute to a university's
forum of ideas.76
Second, this policing system would be too difficult to admin-
ister. Would three consecutive "liberal" or "progressive" resolu-
tions require three "conservative" resolutions for parity, or would
one "moderate" resolution be enough to save the student govern-
ment? How could a university even begin to categorize the resolu-
tions as "moderate" or "radical" in the first place? A university
would be forever subject to lawsuits alleging that its student
government had been captured by one ideology.
Under such an approach, courts would either have to ignore
Good's rationale and defer to the judgment of a university or
routinely entertain legal challenges to student governments. The
first possibility would ignore Good's important qualification and
the First Amendment values behind it. The second would be
unduly burdensome. Hence, Good's solution proves to be no solu-
tion at all.
B. The Smith Approach: Funding Is Unconstitutional
In Smith v Regents of University of California, the California
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prevented the
University of California at Berkeley from using mandatory stu-
dent fees to fund a student senate that passed political resolu-
tions.77 As noted above, the Berkeley student senate had passed
resolutions on such local, state, and national issues as "gay and
lesbian rights, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, gun con-
trol, the reelection of a particular United States Representative,
a municipal initiative to legalize marijuana, and the treatment of
political prisoners in foreign countries."78 The plaintiffs, alleging
that the use of their mandatory dues to fund the resolutions
Good, 542 P2d at 768-69.
77 16 Cal Rptr 2d at 198.
78 Id at 185.
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violated the First Amendment, appealed from a lower court find-
ing that such funding was constitutional.79
Relying primarily on a union dues analogy, the court applied
a strict scrutiny test to the university's funding scheme, requir-
ing the state to show that its funding policy was narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest.0 The court concluded
that the value of the educational opportunity afforded students
participating in the student senate was clearly outweighed by the
First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and remanded to de-
termine whether student fees had been used.8'
In dissent, Justice Arabian argued that even if Berkeley used
mandatory fees to fund its student senate, its funding scheme
would have been constitutional. 2 Although he found a less de-
manding legal standard more consistent with Supreme Court
precedent, he stated that the university's educational interests
were so compelling that he would have reached the same conclu-
sion under the majority's strict scrutiny test.' Justice Arabian
found that the funding was "necessarily or reasonably incurred"
to effectuate the "important" or "substantial" state interests of
exposing students to diverse views and facilitating student de-
bate.' He concluded that "[slo long as the university neither
seeks by these expenditures to impose a particular ideological
orthodoxy nor to stifle intellectual debate, such educational judg-
ments cannot justifiably be questioned." 5
Smith's analysis was incomplete. First, as Justice Arabian
stated, the Smith court's decision to apply a strict scrutiny test
does not follow from the Supreme Court case law on which the
Smith court relied.86 In upholding the imposition of compulsory
"' For a full account of Smith's lengthy procedural history, see id at 185-86.
80 Id at 189.
81 Id at 197-98.
Id at 199 (Arabian dissenting).
Id at 204 n 3.
Id at 204, quoting Keller, 496 US at 14.
16 Cal Rptr 2d at 208 n 6.
In determining whether a government regulation passes constitutional muster, the
Supreme Court will apply one of three different standards of review. The least probing
standard, not at issue here, is called the "mere rationality" or "rational basis" standard.
Applying this lowest-level review, the Court will uphold a regulation if it is conceivable
that there is some rational relation between the means selected by the legislature and a
legitimate legislative objective. See, for example, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v
Murgia, 427 US 307 (1976) (link between being over fifty and being physically unfit was
not so attenuated as to be irrational, even though better means of measuring health were
available). Under this deferential standard, the regulation at issue will almost invariably
be upheld. On the other end of the spectrum, the most probing level of review, which
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union dues in Abood, the Court referred to "important govern-
ment interests" served by the union shop in the system of labor
relations established by Congress. 7 Similarly, in Keller the
Court noted that an integrated state bar served "substantial
public interests" and held that the expenditure of mandatory
dues must be "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose"
of effectuating those interests." Neither decision explicitly ap-
plied a strict scrutiny standard. Thus, Smith's reliance on these
cases in applying a strict scrutiny test appears misplaced.
Second, the Smith court did not adequately address the edu-
cational interests allegedly furthered by funding student govern-
ments. Declaring that the education of participating students was
the university's sole interest, the court ignored other ways in
which political resolutions might serve the university's education-
al mission. 9 Had these justifications been identified and consid-
ered, the court's conclusion might be more persuasive.'
Third, while the court asserted that a less restrictive alterna-
tive existed, it based that conclusion solely on its summary con-
clusion that the present system was too restrictive." Satisfied
with this circular reasoning, the court did not present alterna-
tives that could have provided the same educational benefits
without violating First Amendment rights. This Comment pro-
Smith adopts, is "strict scrutiny": a statute will be upheld only if it is found to be neces-
sary (not merely appropriate) to the attainment of a compelling (not merely desirable)
governmental objective. See, for example, Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) (applying
strict scrutiny and striking down a Virginia law prohibiting interracial marriage). As
Professor Gunther has said, this level of scrutiny is generally "'strict' in theory and fatal
in fact," Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev 1, 8
(1972). The Court has also applied an intermediate level of review, between the strict
scrutiny and rational basis standards. Under this standard, the Court insists that the
regulation at issue "serve important governmental objectives and [ ] be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives." Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 197 (1976) (hold-
ing that the fit between the means of regulation selected-the ban on sale of 3.2 percent
beer to males between eighteen and twenty' years old-and the end sought to be
achieved-promotion of traffic safety-was too tenuous to constitute the required "sub-
stantial relation" between means and end). The Court used this type of analysis in Abood
and Keller.
81 431 US at 222, 215.
'8 496 US at 13-14
'9 16 Cal Rptr 2d at 207-08 (Arabian dissenting).
90 See text accompanying notes 131-33.
" See 16 Cal Rptr 2d at 193, quoting Carroll, 957 F2d at 999, quoting United States
v Albertini, 472 US 675, 689 (1985) ("When mandatory finding is being used to create an
incidental benefit to education at the cost of a significant burden on constitutional rights,
it cannot usually be said that the state is 'promoting a substantial government interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.'").
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poses a resolution that overcomes the inadequacies of both Good
and Smith.
IV. RETHINKING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY
STUDENT GOVERNMENT FUNDING
As the Supreme Court has held, the First Amendment does
not prohibit all compulsory funding of speech. Abood, Keller, and
Lehnert teach that, with respect to unions and state bar associa-
tions, a mandatory fee may be used to support political speech as
long as the speech is sufficiently related to an important govern-
ment interest.92 This Section demonstrates that these cases pro-
vide the proper model for analyzing the mandatory funding of
student government political resolutions. The Supreme Court has
recognized that the line between activities that are sufficiently
related and those that are too attenuated to be constitutionally
justified is not always clear.93 However, applying the "sufficient-
ly related" test expressed in these cases, this Section concludes
that mandatory funding of student government political resolu-
tions often falls within the latter category.
A. The "Sufficiently Related" Test: The Appropriate Analogy
As noted previously, the Supreme Court has restricted the
scope of union political speech that can be constitutionally sup-
ported with mandatory funds. In Lehnert, Justice Blackmun
concluded that the plaintiffs could not be compelled to subsidize
public relations activities because the activities were "not suffi-
ciently related" to the union's collective bargaining function, even
though the activities arguably would have enhanced the reputa-
tion of the teaching profession and thus would have improved the
union's bargaining position.94 Blackmun also stated that the un-
ion could require dissenters to pay for only those lobbying activi-
9 See text accompanying notes 28-45, 87-88.
' Keller, 496 US at 14-16.
Precisely where the line falls between those State Bar activities in which the officials
and members of the bar are acting essentially as professional advisors to those ulti-
mately charged with the regulation of the legal profession, on the one hand, and
those activities having political or ideological coloration which are not reasonably
related to the advancement of such goals, on the other, will not always be easy to
discern. But the extreme ends of the spectrum are clear: Compulsory dues may not
be expended to endorse or advance a gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative.
Id at 15-16.
4 500 US at 528-29 (Blackmun opinion).
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ties within "the limited context of contract ratification or imple-
mentation."95 Dissenters could not be compelled to subsidize lob-
bying on other issues, even matters as closely related to the
union's interests as taxes for the support of public education.'
Likewise, the Supreme Court has restricted the substance of
an integrated state bar's political speech that may be constitu-
tionally supported with mandatory funds. In Keller, the Court
found that the California State Bar could not compel dues payers
to support an annual delegate conference that passed resolutions
on such controversial issues as gun control and a nuclear
freeze. 7 In so doing, the Court emphasized that membership in
the state bar was based on one's status as a lawyer, not as a
voter or citizen; consequently, the bar lacked the representative
right to compel funding for its political resolutions."
Under the analysis of Keller and Lehnert, the First Amend-
ment permits public universities to fund speech with mandatory
student fees in some circumstances. For example, universities
probably may fund ideological and political groups without run-
ning afoul of the First Amendment.9 As one commentator ex-
plains, "[tihe student fee scenario differs from the Abood model
because the universities use mandatory student fees to fund a
forum of ideas, not a particular ideology or a group of students
that functions as the exclusive mouthpiece of the student
body.""° Unlike unions and integrated state bars, student
groups like NOW and the Young Democrats speak only for their
members; they in no way publicly implicate nonaffiliated stu-
dents who disagree with their views. People would not view a
student's silence in the face of speech by a political student group
as a sign of approbation. In addition, these groups compete on an
equal level with all other student groups in a neutral funding
allocation system. A university must allocate its mandatory activ-
ity fees based on need without regard to the viewpoint of a par-
ticular group applying for activity fee funds,'0 ' "and therefore
Id at 522 (Blackmun opinion).
Id at 527 (Blackmun opinion).
9 496 US at 4. See also note 38.
496 US at 12-13.
For a thorough exposition of the issues surrounding ideological and political
student groups, see sources cited in note 47.
1" Comment, 55 U Chi L Rev at 373-74 (cited in note 47).
.o See text accompanying notes 71-75. Typically, the university allocates the distri-
bution to a neutral body, often the student council. If a student group thinks that bias has
affected its allocation of funds, that group can appeal to the university administration.
See Meabon, Alexander, and Hunter, Student Activity Fees (cited in note 4).
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that assessment [to support ideological and political groups] can
be 'perceived broadly as providing a "forum" for a diverse range
of opinion.'"'
0 2
Student government political resolutions, however, pose First
Amendment problems analogous to those presented by unions
and integrated state bar associations. In contrast to the plethora
of diverse ideological and political groups that speak only for
their voluntary members, student government, like a union that
speaks for all employees and an integrated bar that speaks for all
a state's lawyers, purports to speak publicly on behalf of all stu-
dents. As a result, outsiders are far more likely to identify uni-
versity students with the causes and viewpoints espoused by
their student governments' resolutions than with speech by a
partisan student group.0 3 Thus, the Good and Smith cases
erred in failing to differentiate the constitutional questions pre-
sented by student government political resolutions from the ques-
tions raised by ideological and political group speech.0 4
One could argue that Congress or a city council presents a
more fitting analogy to a state university with respect to its fund-
ing of student government political resolutions. According to this
argument, because governmental representative institutions can
constitutionally pass highly controversial political resolutions
over some taxpayers' opposition, so too may a university fund
student government political resolutions over the objections of
"2 Galda, 772 F2d at 1064, quoting its earlier decision reversing summary judgment
for the defendants, Galda v Bloustein, 686 F2d 159, 166 (3d Cir 1982). See also note 68.
103 Because, in the public mind, students are automatically linked with the positions
student governments take on their behalf, a student who would have rather remained
silent on the issues addressed by a student government resolution must either accept the
repugnant viewpoint as her public stance or voice what may be her own unpopular views,
thereby sacrificing her anonymity on the subject. Neither choice is particularly attractive.
With regard to the second choice, Laurence Tribe comments that anonymity has long
been recognized as absolutely essential for the survival of dissident movements. "[Tihe
glare of public disclosure, so healthy in other settings, may operate in the context of
protected but unpopular groups as a clarion call to ostracism or worse." Laurence H.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-26 at 1019 (Foundation, 2d ed 1988). See also
Brown v Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee (Ohio), 459 US 87, 91-98 (1982)
(holding that disclosure provision of Ohio campaign financing law could not be constitu-
tionally applied to Socialist Workers' Party because First Amendment prohibits compelled
disclosure by minor political parties); Talley v California, 362 US 60, 64-65 (1960) (over-
turning convictions based on an ordinance that banned the distribution of handbills not
carrying the name and address of the author, printer, and sponsor); NAACP v Patterson,
357 US 449,463-65 (1958) (reversing civil contempt judgment against NAACP for refusing
to disclose its membership list); Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479, 487-90 (1960) (invalidating
an Arkansas statute requiring each teacher in a state-supported school to file a list of
organizations of which they were members or which they actively supported).
"4 See note 49.
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fee-paying students. In both instances, it appears that represen-
tative bodies espouse the views of the majority after rational
deliberation." 5 However, based on criteria articulated by the
Supreme Court in Keller, a university can be distinguished from
these governmental units.
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal and state
government officials and agencies "may use unrestricted revenue,
whether derived from taxes, dues, fees, tolls, donation, or other
sources, for any purposes within [their] authority." "1c Congress's
decision to pass a resolution condemning apartheid, for example,
reflects political decisions in areas specifically delegated to it by
the Constitution. All governmental bodies must take substantive
positions and decide disputed issues in order to govern.0 As
the Court has recognized, "[i]f every citizen were to have a right
to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with
which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the
public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the
process of government as we know it radically transformed."'
In Keller, the Supreme Court rejected the view that an inte-
grated bar association, while providing valuable public services to
the state in regulating the legal profession, could be equated to a
governmental body. The Court rested this judgment on two prin-
cipal distinctions. First, the Court noted that the California State
Bar, unlike lawmaking institutions, serves merely an advisory
role and is not involved in the direct governance of the state.'°9
Second, it recognized that the bar's members are members be-
cause they are lawyers, not because they are citizens or vot-
ers."0 Consequently, the bar lacks the general representative
right that a government body enjoys."' The Court therefore
found that the bar's use of compulsory dues was subject to the
" For a thorough exposition of the position that state bar associations, labor unions,
and public universities are analogous to governmental bodies, see Cantor, 36 Rutgers L
Rev at 39-52 (cited in note 47) (reviewing implications of typical forced payment arrange-
ments).
1"6 Keller, 496 US at 9, quoting Keller v State Bar of California, 47 Cal 3d 1152, 255
Cal Rptr 542, 551 (1989).
" Keller, 496 US at 9. Government may speak despite citizen disagreement with the
content of its message, for the government is not required to be neutral. Id.
" Id at 12-13. Compare United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 260 (1982) ("The tax system
could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.").
9 496 US at 11.
"0 Id at 12.
. Id at 12-13.
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same constitutional rule as a labor union's use of similar dues."
The considerations that moved the Court in Keller to find
that integrated state bars are better analogized to labor unions
than to lawmaking bodies are equally applicable to student gov-
ernments. First, a state university, while undoubtedly serving
substantial public interests, is created not to participate in the
direct governance of the state, but rather to educate. Student
government political resolutions, like the delegate conference's
resolutions in Keller, are merely "advisory" both to the university
administration in setting university policy and to the lawmaking
institutions that actually do govern. Second, "the reason for per-
mitting the government. . . to spend [tax] money on controversial
projects is that the government is representative of the peo-
ple.""' However, like the lawyers in Keller, whom the bar rep-
resented in only their professional capacity, students attend a
university primarily for an education, not to participate as citi-
zens or voters. These differences demonstrate that a public uni-
versity, with respect to its funding of student government politi-
cal resolutions, is better analogized to a labor union or an inte-
grated bar than to a lawmaking institution.
B. Applying the "Sufficiently Related" Test
Student government political resolutions impose the same
constitutional burden on dissenters as the state bar's resolutions
in Keller. There, the Court held that the delegate conference's
resolutions were unconstitutional because they were not suffi-
ciently related to the California Bar's function of "acting essen-
tially as professional advisers to those ultimately charged with
the regulation of the legal profession.""' Thus, whether a uni-
versity may constitutionally use mandatory student fees to fund
student government political resolutions should depend on
whether the student government resolutions in question are
sufficiently related to the university's educational mission.
Most student government political resolutions are not suffi-
ciently related to a university's educational mission to justify the
First Amendment burden resulting from compulsory funding. In
order to be "sufficiently related," they must directly concern uni-
versity and student affairs."' Instead, political resolutions often
1 Id at 12.
... Id at 11, quoting Abood, 431 US at 259 n 13 (Powell concurring).
114 496 US at 15.
... For example, in discussing the ideological lobbying activities of a political advocacy
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range beyond the purview of student affairs and address topics
about which students hold strong personal views outside of their
capacity as students. One would expect these views to be highly
diverse, given that students represent a broad spectrum of val-
ues, philosophies, and cultures whose sole common objective is
often participation in the educative process. As Justice Blackmun
indicated in Lehnert, "[wlhere the subject of compelled speech is
the discussion of governmental affairs, which is at the core of our
First Amendment freedoms, the burden upon dissenters' rights
extends far beyond the acceptance of the agency shop and is
constitutionally impermissible."" 6 A university thus may not
fund student government political resolutions that are highly
public, controversial, and outside the scope of student affairs." 7
Under this analysis, a university is not altogether forbidden
from funding some student government resolutions. But, as in
the case of integrated state bars and labor unions, the line be-
tween student government activities germane to the university's
educative function and those lacking a sufficiently strong con-
group, the Galda court noted that the subject matter of the lobbying at issue was an
additional factor which burdened students' rights. 772 F2d at 1065. While matters such as
a nuclear freeze initiative "may affect the general public, those causes are not particularly
germane to students of the University qua students." Id.
116 500 US at 522 (Blackmun opinion) (citations omitted). Student governments do
indeed aim at a large and important public audience. Their resolutions are often widely
publicized in major newspapers, see Section I, in leaflets, on flyers, in informational
books, in letters to local, state and national officials, and in televised rallies. See, for
example, Smith, 16 Cal Rptr 2d at 198 (discussing the methods that Berkeley's student
senate used to publicize their resolutions). Student governments thus target audiences
outside the university community, whether it be the voting public, the news media, the
United States military, local and state legislatures, Congress, or the President. As Justice
Blackmun has noted, "[t]he burden upon freedom of expression is particularly great
where ... the compelled speech is in a public context." Lehnert, 500 US at 522 (Blackmun
opinion).
" Note that this analysis would not change if a university were to fund a student
government that passed political resolutions with money derived from other sources, such
as directly from the administration, the bookstore, or other concessions, while "segregat-
ing" the mandatory fees for other, nonpolitical purposes. In Abood, the Court rejected such
earmarking as a remedy for constitutional violations caused by the use of mandatory fees
for political purposes. Because earmarking leaves the same total amount of funds at the
organization's disposal and permits the organization to spend the same amount on politi-
cal activities, earmarking "is of bookkeeping significance only rather than a matter of real
substance." Abood, 431 US at 237 n 35, quoting Retail Clerks Local 1625 v Schermerhorn,
373 US 746, 753 (1963). For these reasons, the Court has held in the agency-shop context
that "[ilt is plainly not an adequate remedy to limit the use of the actual dollars collected
from dissenting employees to collective-bargaining [nonpolitical and nonideologicall
purposes." Abood, 431 US at 237 n 35. Similarly, a university cannot solve the constitu-
tional problems associated with funding student governments that pass political resolu-
tions simply by creating such artificial allocative distinctions.
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nection will not always be easy to draw."8 Some student gov-
ernment resolutions will involve highly controversial topics that
also relate to student affairs.
For example, student governments have passed resolutions
demanding that the ROTC be ejected from campus because of the
U.S. Military's ban on homosexuals." 9 Admittedly, such a reso-
lution does involve a highly controversial subject of public policy,
that is, the role that sexual orientation should play in society.
However, it also relates directly to student affairs: many
students' career plans and tuition payments hinge directly on
their participation in the ROTC. University administrators must
fashion the policies and regulations by which the university is to
be governed. In order for these policies to be effective, the input
of the student body is both desirable and necessary. The
university's interest in maintaining contact with the student
body, together with the students' interest in conveying their
concerns about campus affairs to the university administration
via their representatives, probably makes such resolutions "suffi-
ciently related" to justify university funding.
Given the extremely broad nature of a public university's
educational mission, all student government political resolutions,
even if not related to student affairs, probably have some value
to university interests. However, merely because a student gov-
ernment resolution might serve the university's interest in edu-
cating its students and promoting debate in some remote way
does not make it automatically "sufficiently related" to pass First
Amendment muster.
If a university's funding decisions were always constitutional
provided that they served the university's educational mission in
any manner, students' First Amendment protections would be
subject to the discretion of a university's administration. First
Amendment rights would effectively assume a secondary status
in the university context. But the Supreme Court has consistent-
ly rejected the subordination of First Amendment rights to uni-
versity policy, declaring that "the precedents of this Court leave
no room for the view that... First Amendment protections
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large. Quite to the contrary, 'It]he vigilant protec-
tion of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools. '""
118 See note 93.
. See text accompanying notes 9-10.
12* Healy v James, 408 US 169, 180 (1972), quoting Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479, 487
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In determining whether a student government resolution is
sufficiently related to university interests, a court should con-
strue such interests narrowly. Indeed, in the analogous context of
an integrated state bar, the Supreme Court has implied that it
will define an institution's interests restrictively in determining
whether compelled funding is justified. The California Bar's reso-
lutions that the Court struck down in Keller arguably educated
participating lawyers and promoted debate within the legal com-
munity about the law's treatment of controversial social issues,
vital components of the bar's self-defined function. Indeed, the
American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Code of Professional
Responsibility recognizes that lawyers, "[bly reason of education
and experience,... are especially qualified to recognize deficien-
cies in the legal system and to initiate corrective measures there-
in."'" Accordingly, the ABA mandates that a lawyer should "do
his part individually and as a member of an organized bar to
improve his profession, the courts and the law."'22 The ABA
specifically charges lawyers with the duty to work toward the
repeal of outmoded laws and the passage of those to serve the
public interest."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the resolutions
on gun control and nuclear weapons were not sufficiently related
to the California Bar's mission to justify the burden on
(1960). Furthermore, the Galda court recognized that the concerns of labor unions and
universities differ, "particularly in light of the [university's] traditional interest in pre-
senting and discussing differing philosophies and theories on a wide range of topics";
nevertheless, the court declared that t]he relevance ofAbood, however, is not lost" in the
university setting. 772 F2d at 1067.
12 Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 8-1 (1980). The ABA further directs
lawyers that "[a]s a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law .... As a
member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its
use for clients [and] employ that knowledge in reform of the law .... A lawyer should aid
the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in
the public interest." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble 5 (1994).
"= Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 8-1 n 1, quoting Arthur T.
Vanderbilt, The Five Functions of the Lawyer: Service to Clients and the Public, 40 ABA J
31, 31 (1954).
' The Model Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
Rules of law are deficient if they are not just, understandable, and responsive to the
needs of society. If a lawyer believes that the existence or absence of a rule of law,
substantive or procedural, causes or contributes to an unjust result, he should en-
deavor by lawful means to obtain appropriate changes in the law. He should encour-
age the simplification of laws and the repeal or amendment of laws that are outmod-
ed.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 8-2 (1980).
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dissenters' First Amendment rights.' Thus, in applying the
"sufficiently related" test in Keller, the Court defined the scope of
the bar's interests narrowly, even though the range of the bar's
actual functions is much broader.
125
Furthermore, in accordance with these restrictive parameters
that the Court has placed around the "sufficiently related" criteri-
on, the Court in Lehnert indicated that a union's funding of polit-
ical resolutions must be carefully tailored to serve its interests
without undue infringement on First Amendment rights.
12
Thus, where a university has other, less intrusive ways of achiev-
ing its goals, funding political resolutions that pose a significant
First Amendment burden should not be constitutionally permissi-
ble."2 No one can doubt the legitimacy of a public university's
interest in educating participating students and encouraging
debate within the student body.2 State universities encourage
the development of student extracurricular life to supplement
learning in the classroom." Yet, even when the university has
124 Keller, 496 US at 16.
'2 Id at 15-16.
" 500 US at 518. The Lehnert Court held that in order to be constitutional an expen-
diture cannot "significantly add" to the First Amendment burden of compelling all work-
ers to pay dues to the union that represents them. Id at 519.
" Even partisan-student-group cases have recognized the importance of this princi-
ple. The Carroll court, which required a "substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation," required that the university regulation be
"narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary intrusion on freedom of expression." 957 F2d at
999 (quoting United States v Albertini, 472 US 675, 689 (1985); Schad v Mount Ephraim,
452 US 61, 69 n 7 (1981)). Also, while expressly adopting the principles in Abood, the
Galda court held that a state regulation "unnecessarily restrict[s] constitutionally protect-
ed liberty, [when] there is open a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interest."
772 F2d at 1066.
"2 See Alabama Student Party v Student Government Ass'n of University of Alabama,
867 F2d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir 1989), where the court noted that the university viewed its
student government association as a "learning laboratory" through which students who
are interested in pursuing a career in the public sphere may gain experience in the
democratic political process. The court noted that "[s]tudent government ... constitute[s]
a forum reserved for its intended purpose, a supervised learning experience for students
interested in politics and government." Id.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the free exchange of ideas at public univer-
sities is critical to the survival of our democratic institutions. "The Nation's future de-
pends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authori-
tative selection.'" Keyishian v Board of Regents of University of State of New York, 385 US
589, 603 (1967), quoting United States v Associated Press, 52 F Supp 362, 372 (S D NY
1943), aff'd, 326 US 1 (1944). "Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire,
to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civiliza-
tion will stagnate and die." Sweezy v New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 250 (1957).
" See, for example, Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 279 n 2 (1981) (Extracurricular
activities are "critical aspect[s] of campus life."); Carroll, 957 F2d at 999-1000 (stressing
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a sufficiently compelling interest to require a person to subsidize
an organization against his or her will, the resulting burden on
freedom of speech "requires that the regulation be carefully tai-
lored to minimize the infringement."1
30
A university can pursue its educational interests in other
ways that do not compel students to financially contribute to a
student government that passes political resolutions with which
they disagree."' First, a university could avoid First Amend-
ment problems and still educate students participating in student
government by maintaining a student government that did not
pass political resolutions. Student governments are responsible
for allocating the student budget and communicating student
concerns to the university administration. Participants could
learn from managing these student-related activities, which have
traditionally constituted the majority of student government
business and remain a proper function for an entity purporting to
represent all the students in their capacity as students.
Participating students might still be able to pass resolutions
closely tied to student affairs. In Keller, while the California Bar
the educative value of participating in a range of extracurricular activities); Veed v
Schwartzkopf, 353 F Supp 149, 152 (D Neb 1973), aff'd, 478 F2d 1407 (8th Cir 1973)
(reasoning that extracurricular groups are as much a part of the educational process as
are classroom teachings).
130 Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v Hudson, 475 US 292, 303 (1986) (striking
down a union's constitutional safeguards as inadequate). In Hudson, the Supreme Court
reiterated Abood's message that "[ilnfringements on freedom of association 'may be
justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive
of associational freedoms.'" Id at 303 n 11, quoting Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468
US 609, 623 (1984).
131 It is unlikely that a university can escape the limitations of the First Amendment
by simply offering objecting students a refund upon request. While the Abood Court
explicitly refrained from addressing the question of whether a refund mechanism is suffi-
cient to render constitutional a fee collection and expenditure, 431 US at 242 n 45, the
Supreme Court later explicitly recognized that "a rebate approach" is inadequate because
dissenters' funds were used even temporarily for causes they opposed. Hudson, 475 US at
309-10 (striking down a union's rebate procedure as inadequate). See also Keller, 496 US
at 17 (explicitly adopting Hudson in the integrated bar setting). Thus, state bars and
unions cannot use a member's dues even temporarily for impermissible purposes.
Similarly, a system in which a university would refund objecting students' fees after
a political resolution is passed and publicized seems equally problematic. Both courts and
commentators have generally rejected the proposition that a student-fee refund mecha-
nism could remedy a potentially unconstitutional fee allocation. See Note, 15 Rutgers L J
at 178-79 (cited in note 47); Comment, 11 J Col & Univ L at 495-99 (cited in note 47). As
one court noted, "even a temporary exaction of the [ I] fee... cannot be [constitutionally]
justified .... " Galda v Bloustein, 686 F2d 159, 169 n 18 (3d Cir 1982). "[A] funding
system requiring continual payments and subsequent refunds to dissenters may not
satisfy the requirements of the first amendment." Id at 168.
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could not constitutionally fund resolutions on controversial politi-
cal issues, the Court was equally adamant that bar members
would have no constitutional objection to resolutions disciplining
bar members or recommending a code of ethics for the legal pro-
fession."2 Likewise, student governments could presumably
debate and pass resolutions on such important student affairs as
tuition levels, financial aid, and academic programming. Such
resolutions, within the scope of an assembly elected to represent
the student body to the administration, could give participating
students the valuable educative experience universities seek to
provide through the student government without violating First
Amendment rights.
Second, students could gain the same educational experience
by joining student debating societies, whose core purpose is de-
bating and passing resolutions on important public issues. Partic-
ipation in such a group would afford a student all of the educa-
tional benefits he would have received from doing the exact same
activity in student government.
Third, nearly all public universities currently fund many
political student groups with widely divergent viewpoints and
ideologies, thereby promoting an atmosphere of vigorous public
debate in which individual students may voice their political
views.' While ideological and political student groups provide
just as effective a medium for students to express themselves,
these groups do not purport to be, and would not be viewed as,
the official voice of all students. This insures that no speech will
be excluded, that debate will flourish, that all who want to con-
tribute to the controversy on an issue will be able to speak for
themselves, and that all those who wish to remain silent can do
so without forfeiture of their First Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has shown that student government political
resolutions impose a substantial burden on the First Amendment
rights of students who either disagree with the position taken in
a particular resolution or who wish to remain silent on the issue.
132 496 US at 16.
13 The notable exceptions are the University of California campuses. See text accom-
panying notes 57-61. No other court before or since the California Supreme Court's ruling
in Smith has prohibited a public university from funding political or ideological student
groups generally. Indeed, courts have been nearly unanimous in their rejection of such
constitutional challenges. See note 48.
854 [62:825
Compulsory Funding of Student Government
Because these highly public, controversial student government
resolutions purport to speak on behalf of all the students, univer-
sities may not constitutionally use mandatory student fees to
fund them unless they are sufficiently related to the university's
educational interests. In determining whether a student govern-
ment resolution is sufficiently related to university interests, a
court should construe these interests narrowly as well as consid-
er whether the university has other, less intrusive means by
which to achieve its interests.
In most cases, restricting a university from funding student
government political resolutions will not impair the university's
educational commitment. Often a university easily can both edu-
cate participating students and maintain an atmosphere condu-
cive to debate and controversy without imposing a burden on dis-
senting students. By not funding political resolutions, a universi-
ty would lose few educational benefits while still protecting
students' First Amendment rights. Courts should look favorably
on such a compromise, where everyone benefits and little is sacri-
ficed.
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